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Abstract 
Based on a panel data analysis of 21 Sub-Saharan Africa countries for the period 1998- 2007, we examined the 
relationship between governance and development performance following World Bank observation linking 
Africa’s development problems to governance crisis. We use the datasets from Worldwide Governance Indicators 
to measure the quality of governance and investigate the hypothesis that governance matters for development. 
We find that the rule of law, regulatory quality and political stability are positive and significantly associated 
with development outcomes. The results suggest that the aspect of governance relevant to SSA has to do with 
strong rule of law, regulatory framework and political stability with the usual policy prescription of institutional 
reforms for re-invigorating development in the region. 
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1. Introduction 
“Good governance is perhaps the most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development”
1
. 
The economic performance of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) overtime has been dismal as revealed by basic 
indicators of development such that the region is still a laggard behind other regions of the world despite 
implementing series of economic reforms with emphasis on stabilization and structural adjustment. For instance, 
the growth record has been slow and episodic. From a moderate annual average growth rate of 5.0 percent at 
1960-1975, it plunged to 2.0 percent for 1976-1995
2
 before rising to 3.7 percent for 1996-2005 due to 
significant economic recovery (see Fosu, 2009). In terms of human development, the human development index
3
 
based on 2005 Human Development Report (HDR) reveals little or no improvements as 30 out of the 32 
countries classified in the ‘low human development’ category are in SSA for which Diagne (2007) observed that 
“the HDI curve for SSA has remained flat since 1990”. With extremely high poverty incidence, weak institutions 
and poor social conditions, development remains elusive to SSA countries.  
While development models and policies may be capable of explaining the development performance of 
SSA countries over time, more fundamental is the consideration of the institutions of governance which 
according to North (1990) structures the incentives that shapes human interactions, whether social, economic and 
political, and the policies likely to be chosen and implemented. Over the last three decades, governance issues 
have dominated the discourse on African’s development agenda following the assertion by the World Bank in 
1989 linking the litany of Africa’s development problems to governance crisis (Brautigam, 1991; Brautigam and 
Knack, 2004).  Many African states, till date, are embodiments of poor institutions of governance such as poor 
quality of institutions, weak rule of law, ill-defined property rights, and absence of accountability, political 
instability and high levels of corruption.  
Empirical evidence from the development literature have confirm that governance (institutions in 
general) matters for improved economic performance (see Hall and Jones, 1997; Keefer and Knack, 1997; 
Kaufmann et al, 1999; Rodrik et al, 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Governance may affect development 
in several ways (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; Lio and Liu, 2008). For instance, the functioning of the market 
system is maintained by creating institutions that protects property rights, a judicial system that administers 
justice and enforces contracts thereby affecting the incentives for production and investment. Further, good 
governance supports a low transaction cost and competitive environment for innovation, adoption of appropriate 
technology and sound economic policies. Good governance is important for promoting development as 
                                                        
1 Kofi Annan, Former Secretary General of the United Nations (Resnick and Birner, 2006). 
2 This period is regarded as ‘Africa’s lost decades’ since there was a sharp deterioration in the socio-economic conditions of Africans below 
the level prevailing at the beginning of the decade due to a combination of  adverse external developments, structural and institutional 
bottlenecks and policy error (UNCTAD, 2001). 
3 The index is a summary indicator of overall development performance and economic well-being. It is composed of three components, 
namely, income, level of education/adult literacy and life expectancy. 
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acknowledged above by the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan (see footnote 3 above). 
With growing interest in the effects of governance and cross-country evidence that institutions of 
governance matters in explaining differences across countries in incomes and growth rates, the paper utilizes 
three out of six governance indicators developed by Kaufmann et al. (2008) for 21 Sub-Saharan African 
countries over the period 1998-2007 to test the hypothesis that governance can explain significant variation in 
development performance across countries and over time. The aim is to examine the relative impact of each of 
these dimensions of governance - rule of law, quality of regulatory framework and absence of political violence 
and instability - on development performance outcomes in SSA which has received little attention from the 
related literature. 
The paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 provides a survey of relevant literature on governance; 
Section 3 details the methodology and data; while the results are presented in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes 
the paper. 
2.  Literature Review 
2.1 The concept of Governance. 
Governance has it root word in “govern” and is usually thought of as “government” though it transcends 
the former due to its complexity and as a universal force existing in all societies. Governance is used on a daily 
basis by people to manage human relationships, just as corporations and countries use it to manage their 
interaction and activities with several realities of the term ranging from related notions such as state governance, 
corporate governance, local governance, global governance etc. 
Despite its assuming great importance at various levels - national, regional and international - no 
internationally acceptable definition exists for the term.  At the international level, the definition of governance 
varies across international institutions, though with similar content.  The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) defines governance as “the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority in 
the management of a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the complex mechanisms, processes and 
institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise 
their legal rights and obligations” (Resnick and Birner, 2006). The European Commission refers to governance as 
“the rules, processes and behaviour by which interests are articulated, resources are generated and power is 
exercised within a society”. The World Bank through its Development Institute’s Task Force on Governance 
views governance from both an analytic and operational framework. Thus, governance is defined as “the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good”.  This includes the 
process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to 
effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them (Resnick and Birner, 2006; Kaufman et al., 
1999).  
In general, governance is understood to be a neutral concept with the exercise of power and authority 
lying at its heart (Brautigam, 1991).  Conventionally, it means “the manner in which power is exercised by 
authorities in managing both the social and economic resources of a country for overall development”. 
Governance lays emphasis on the institutional framework (both formal and informal rules) in the management of 
a country’s resources. On the other hand, the concept of “good” governance, which is a subset of the wider 
concept of governance, connotes the exercise of power by the various tiers of government particularly in an 
efficient, honest, equitable and transparent manner. Good governance is characterized by the principles of 
participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, effectiveness, equity and strategic vision; whereas “bad” 
governance entails absence of the above principles in the exercise of power with widespread corruption as an 
obvious sign. 
Consequently, if governance should mean the very essence of exercising power to manage the affairs of a 
country, then it must be based on the consent and approval of the governed (i.e. all the citizens). It is the degree to 
which the institutions and processes allow people to participate in decisions affecting them, and at the same time, 
make those in government accountable to them that is referred to as the quality of a country’s governance. Thus, 
Qureshi (1999) opines that the quality of life enjoyed by citizens resulting from the impact of the exercise of 
authority determines the quality of governance. 
2.2 Governance and Development  
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The link between governance and development is better understood by exploring the various dimensions of 
governance and how it affects development performance. The operationalization of governance by Kaufmann et 
al. (1999) into three aspects with six institutional dimensions offers an appealing construct for the theoretical 
background. These aspect of governance which includes “respect for the institutional framework”, “quality of 
government action”, and “selection of the authority” are derived from the governance definition by Kaufmann et 
al. (1999) as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. 
Following Meon and Weill (2005) and Lio and Liu (2008), the first aspect of governance that captures the 
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them is 
referred to as the “respect for the institutional framework”. This aspect consists of two dimensions, namely, the 
“rule of law” and the “control of corruption”.  The “rule of law” captures the confidence and obedience of the 
rules of the society by economic agents. The absence of laws, law enforcement or government creates a 
free-for-all society with anarchistic tendencies. Economic agents would rather indulge in stealing as the easiest 
route towards economic activity than engaging in productive activities. However, the institution of fair and 
predictable rules creates an enabling environment and provides the basis for economic and social interactions 
among agents. For instance, the enforceability of contracts, protection of property rights, effective and 
predictable judiciary play significant role in accelerating private investment which is crucial for economic 
development. “Control of corruption” on the other hand indicates the extent to which public offices are exploited 
for private gains. The involvement of the state in the market economy for the purpose of reducing transaction 
costs brings about rent-seeking activities. The outcome is a diversion of resources from productive activities and 
erosion of the governance infrastructures which are crucial for economic development. 
The second aspect of governance, the “quality of government action” consists of two dimensions of 
governance, namely, “government effectiveness” and “regulatory quality”. “Government effectiveness” captures 
the ability of government to design and implement sound policies as well as the provision of public goods and 
services.  The provision of public goods and services in the form basic social infrastructures such good road 
networks, portable drinking water, steady electricity supply etc. determines the extent of a country’s 
development. The inability of government to effectively deliver on these public goods along with sound 
macroeconomic policies creates a hostile environment which retards development. The second dimension, 
“regulatory quality” measures the tendency of adopting market-friendly policies in the area of business and 
trade. Its importance to development is best understood through the adoption of policies by most governments 
which influences the terms of trade and drives a wedge between world prices and domestic prices. For instance, 
high taxation, excessive regulation in areas of foreign trade and business development, industrial protectionism 
limits private sector participation and discourages investment in the economy. Whereas, market-based reforms 
such deregulation and liberalization promotes the expansion of the private sector’s role in the economy. 
The third aspect of governance, the “selection of the authority” consists of two dimensions, namely, “voice 
and accountability” and “political stability”. The extent to which the citizens of a country are able to participate 
in the selection of governments is capture by “voice and accountability”.  It emphasizes the independence of the 
media, civil society especially in monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions. 
The participation of interest groups in policy-making debate promotes transparency. Without it, improved 
governance and policies can be impeded. Active participation of all groups in the economic and political 
activities facilitates the enforcement of decisions and averts state capture by a few interest groups interested in 
rent-seeking activities. The “political stability” dimension captures the extent to which the government in power 
can be overthrown through unconstitutional means or violence. Political instability creates insecurity and 
threatens private investment. Development is unattainable in a state of violence and anarchy. 
While these dimensions of governance - the rule of law, control of corruption, government effectives, 
regulatory quality, voice and accountability and political stability - offers an effective tools for assessing the 
status of governance in different countries, they are interrelated. In other words, these dimensions of governance 
are complements to each other and not substitutes (Campos and Nugent, 1999). The effectiveness and 
satisfaction of one dimension depends on the effectiveness and satisfaction of another. For instance, effective 
delivery of public goods and services by government requires political stability which in turn depends on the 
ability of citizens to participate in the selection and monitoring of government actions. Persistent corruption or 
fragile rule of law reduces the effectiveness of governments in the provision of developmental infrastructure and 
reduces people’s confidence in the government which may undermine regulatory quality and political stability. 
Thus, improvements in the quality of governance reinforces development through low transaction costs, effective 
delivery of public goods and services, sound economic policies and induces investment and technological 
development whereas decay in the institutions of governance in a country creates adverse conditions for 
development. 
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2.3 Indicators of Governance 
 Governance indicator is a measure of the state of governance in a country and is often narrowed down to 
specific characteristics such as levels of corruption, human rights, civil and political liberties, etc. Until recently, 
obtaining quantitative measures of any characteristics of governance was impossible and no easy matter as 
several of these characteristics are, in principle, multidimensional. However, several new sources of governance 
data have been compiled and made public in recent years for relatively large number of countries with empirical 
relevance in the development literature. According to Herrera, et al. (2005), the introduction of the “quality” of 
institutions, political regimes among others has overcome the limitations of the traditional approach which 
considered the classic production factors (capital and labour) and technological change in explaining long-run 
development paths. Table 1 provides some of the international database on governance and their sources with a 
discussion on those widely used in the empirical literature below.   
Table 1. International Database on Governance 
Indicator/Database Institution 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) World Bank 
Governance Matters I-IV Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi/World Bank 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Political Risk Service Group 
Index of Economic Freedom The Heritage Foundation 
Corruption Perceptions Index Transparency International 
Political rights, Civil liberties, Freedom status Gastil/Freedom House 
Polity I-IV (Politity's Institutionalized democracy Index) Gurr/University of Maryland (CIDCM) 
Bollen's Index (Bollen's liberal-democracy Index) 
Bollen/University of North 
Caroline(ICPSR) 
EFC (Ethno-linguistic fractionalization) Roeder/Dept. of Science, University of 
Carolina, San Diego 
World Values (Trust, well-being etc.) Inglehart/WVE Association, Institute for 
Social Research, University of Michigan 
Source: Herrera, Razafrindrakoto and Roubaud (2005) 
 
Aside from the Freedom House measures, ICGR and Polity IV datasets, the World Governance Indicators 
dataset developed by World Bank researchers, Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido–Lobaton is the 
most comprehensive dataset on governance because it is an aggregation of a wide variety of data on 250 
measures from 25 separate data sources including the Freedom House’s civil liberties and political rights indices, 
and the ICRG (Kaufmann et al., 1999). 
The governance dataset captures three dimensions of governance: (i) “the process by which government are 
selected, monitored and replaced; (ii) capacity of government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies; and (iii) the respect of the citizens and the state for the institutions that govern the economic and social 
interactions among them” (Kaufmann, et al., 1999a). The  dataset measures six indicators (two each) 
corresponding to these dimensions by reducing the 250 measures through as unobserved components model, and 
is available for the periods 1996, 1998, 2000 and annually for 2002 – 2007 ( Kaufmann et al., 2008). The first 
dimension of governance captures two indicators: “voice and accountability” and political “stability”. While 
Voice and Accountability measures “the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the 
selection of governments”, the Political Stability indicator measures “the likelihood of a change in government 
either through violent or unconstitutional means.” The indicators “Government Effectiveness” and “Regulatory 
Quality” belong to the second dimension. While the former measures ‘the quality of public service provision, the 
quality of the bureaucracy and the credibility of government commitment to policies; the latter focuses on 
whether policies are market friendly in the areas of trade and business. The last dimension also has two 
indicators, namely, “Rule of law” and “Control of Corruption”. The ‘rule of law’ includes the enforcement of 
property rights and the predictability of rules governing social and economic interactions; ‘control of corruption’ 
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measures the perception of corruption conventionally defined as “the exercise of public power for private gains.” 
The six indicators have standardized measurement unit such that estimate of the distribution of each 
governance indicator has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one with the resultant estimate of each 
governance indicator lying within the range of -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values implying better outcomes. The 
dataset has its own flaws. The wide error margin of governance estimates and as noted by Resnick and Birner 
(2006), countries estimates may change over time with increasing data availability without any substantive 
change within the countries. Hence, Kaufmann, et al., (2003) emphasized caution when using the indicators for 
cross–country comparisons of the level of governance prevailing in a particular country.   
2.4 Crisis of Governance in SSA 
The governance crisis in SSA which was first identified by the World Bank in 1989 has persisted ever 
since with grievous implication on the growth and development prospects of the region. Nevertheless, the 
continuing governance crisis is explained by some causes, which are captured in literature. 
State capacity and governmental institutions in many SSA countries are weak. This according to 
Brautigam and Knack (2004) is due to colonialism which failed to develop indigenous institutions to meet the 
demands of modern states. Evidence from Acemoglu, et al (2000) suggests that Africa is poorer compared to the 
rest of the world not as a result of purely geographic or cultural factors but due to weak institutions. According to 
them, European powers created “extractive colonies” in Africa due to its unfavourable environment for their 
settlement. As such, the institutions introduced by the colonialists were devoid of checks and balances to enforce 
accountability and the trend has persisted even after political independence. Presently, the state in many SSA 
countries is greatly influenced by neo-patrimonial tendencies and poor policy choices which have severely 
hampered state capacity (Ndulu and O’Connell, 1999; Luiz, 2009). 
Political instability and wars have contributed to poor governance. Much of African history is replete 
with cases of political instability ranging from violent coups to civil wars. According to the Organization of 
African Unity (now African Union), out of 26 African conflict which took place between 1963 to 1998 affecting 
61 percent of the continent’s total population, 7 were classified as inter-state while 19 occurred within countries 
(Luiz, 2009). Aside from impacting negatively on governance, Collier (1999 cited in Luiz, 2009) identifies five 
effects associated with political violence. These includes, the destruction of physical and human capital, 
reduction in savings, diversion of foreign direct investment from domestic economies with concomitant capital 
flight, disruption of economic activities and structural change in government expenditure from the provision of 
social services to military expenditure. 
Third, poor leadership is a continual problem. Many SSA countries are plagued by the leadership 
problem. African leaders, aside from being malevolent authoritarian are noted for their high level corruption and 
in no position to promote development (Luiz, 2009). By amending state’s constitution or rigging elections, 
majority of African leaders continue to perpetuate themselves in office. Statistics show that between 1960 and 
1999 only 7 percent African leaders left office via election compared to 60 percent overthrown in a coup 
invasion, war or by assassination  with an average time in office of 7.2 years  compared to 3.2 years in Europe 
(Luiz, 2009). Corrupt elongation of tenure of office has adversely affected effective leadership, which is critical 
to building strong and efficient institutions for good governance. 
Fourth, is the limiting impact of foreign aid. Evidence from some studies has pointed to the fact that 
high levels of aid can work for and against governance improvement. According to Brautigam and Knack (2004), 
high levels of aid could affect governance in several ways: either to build state capacity and establish institutions 
or weaken institutions and established perverse incentives. Their major empirical finding is that deterioration in 
the quality of governance is associated with high levels of aid to SSA. Thus, aids weaken institutions and 
introduce perverse incentives in SSA. Further, it is argued among scholars that the conditional aid in the 1980s to 
Africa, created political turmoil that was unexpected (Ndulu and O’Connell, 1999). On the whole, aid has been 
found to undermine the institutional capacity in Africa.  
2.5 Empirical Evidence 
Empirical evidence emanating from cross-country studies buttresses the fact that the quality of 
governance has robust effects on growth and other development conditions (e.g. poverty and inequality). The 
quality of governance as captured in these studies lay emphasis on institutional quality in the form of rule of law, 
political stability, civil liberties and rights, political freedom, etc. These cross-country studies arguably include 
measures of governance as independent variables while utilizing some development indicators such as growth, 
poverty and inequality as dependent variables. 
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Early contributions on the effect of quality of governance on growth and development includes Barro 
(1997), Knack and Keefer (1997) and Mauro (1995). Recent studies supportive of the above evidence are 
provided in Chong and Calderon (2000), Hall and Jones (1999), Campos and Nugent (1999) and Kaufmann, et 
al. (1999a). For instance, Kaufmann, et al. (1999) after aggregating different dimensions of governance into six 
aggregate indicators, examined their respective association on three development indicators: per capita income, 
infant mortality and adult literacy. They found that a one-standard deviation increase in any of the six indicators 
of governance causes between a two-and-a-half to four fold increase in each development indicator and 
concluded that governance matters for growth and development. On the other hand, studies such as Knack and 
Keefer (1995), Acemoglu, et al. (2000), Rodrik et al. (2002) used the security of property rights as their measure 
of institution in arguing for the positive impact of institutions on economic growth. Gwartney, et al. (2006) used 
the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) to investigate causation between institutional quality and economic 
growth. Their study showed that improvements in the quality of institutions (as measure by the EFW) lead to 
more growth in future, with no feedback from growth to improvement in institutional quality. 
Aside from linking governance with growth, other studies have highlighted the effect of governance on 
poverty and inequality. Examining whether the policies and institutions that promote growth also have impact on 
poverty, Dollar and Kraay (2000) using a sample of 92 countries over the period 1950 – 1999, found that the 
‘rule of law’ indicator from the World governance data set was positively and significantly correlated (with low 
magnitude) with the growth in per capita income. Chong and Gradstein (2004) examined the impact of political 
institutions on income inequality for 121 industrial and developing countries using the six indicators from the 
World governance data set, the ICRG civil liberties and political rights indices, and country credit ratings as 
proxies for political institutions. Their major findings was that poor institutions and income inequality reinforces 
each other regardless of the measure of political institutions, with the ‘political stability’ indicator from the 
KKZL dataset having the largest influence on inequality. Similarly, studies have confirmed that better 
governance fosters agricultural productivity (Lio and Liu, 2008) and efficiency (Meon and Weill, 2005). 
Admittedly, the empirical literature on governance is covered here is few but asserts that governance is 
an important factor for growth and development. Besides, some methodological challenges have been raised.  
According to Khan (2006), the indices used to proxy the quality of governance are liable to bias and subjectivity. 
This view is supported by Weyland (Keefer, 2004), although he opines that their usage has brought statistical 
analysis to bear on topics previously investigated in theory and case studies. Another issue is the consideration of 
the relationship between governance and development on one-side while overlooking the possibility of a 
feedback effect, thereby creating simultaneity and endogeneity problems. Thus, Resnick and Birner (2006) 
asserts that “econometric studies typically suffer from bias created by omitted variables and the ubiquitous 
problem of endogeneity”. 
Following Campos and Nugent (1999), we acknowledge the methodological challenges raised in the 
literature and emphasize with caution that that the analysis is exploratory with no intent at putting forward a 
formal theoretical model whose findings can be validated against a set of hypothesis. Whereas poor economic 
performance can retard the establishment of well-functioning institutions due to lack of resources, higher 
standard of living is a panacea for curbing corruption and political violence. Studies (e.g. Hall and Jones, 1999; 
Rodrik et al., 2002) have shown that indeed the direction of causality runs from bad institutions to poor 
economic performances. Hence, we assume that the institutions of governance are exogenous to development 
performance. 
3. Methodology and Data  
Based on the hypothesis that better governance improves economic development, we test empirically the 
relationship between governance and development performance in SSA. We estimate the following model 
specification of the relationship: 
	 		
 	 	
	 	 		
	 		 	    (1) 
where  is the per capita income as proxy for development performance,  is introduced as 
control variable to capture  openness of the economy   which has already been used in the literature. Both 
variables are transformed into their logarithmic form.  is the country’s  institutional quality 
according to the index of governance. The institutions of governance are proxied by three standardized measures 
to capture three dimensions of governance as: (i) the process by which those in authority are selected monitored 
and replaced;(ii) capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies; 
and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions 
among them (Kaufmann, et al., 2008).  These measures include the rule of law index (), regulatory 
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quality index () and political stability index ().The term  represent the stochastic disturbance 
term and is assume to be independent over all time periods and for each country i. 
For purpose of sensitivity analysis, we use the Human Development Index (HDI) as an alternative 
measure of development performance to robustness checks. A priori, we expect the 	
 parameters (excluding 
the intercept term) to assume positive signs as postulated in theory. 
Overall, the sample covers 21 Sub-Saharan African countries
4
 with observations for eight years, 1998, 
2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, which forms a balanced panel data structure. The data on 
institutions of governance is obtained from Kaufmann et al. (2008), while the Real GDP Per capita and trade 
openness (sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP) are from Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers 
and Aten, 2009). Human development index is retrieved from various Human Development  Reports (HDRs), 
downloaded from the UNDP website (http://hdr.undp.org/reports) All data collected for each variable are 
harmonized across the sample. In other words, homogenous methods are utilized in compiling the data for each 
variable is same across countries included in the sample. 
4. Results. 
As first sight into the impact of governance on development, we plot the proxy for development 
performance (i.e .,  !) against the governance indices (, , ) as presented in 
Figure 1 (Panels 1-6). A quick inspection of these panels reveals a positive relationship between the quality of 
governance and development performance as confirmed by the slopes of the regression lines. 
As a complement to the above graphs, Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients for the sample 
variables. Positive correlations exist among all variables. Specifically, the correlation between the measures of 
development performance and the quality of governance are positive thus re-affirming the relationship from the 
earlier graphical plots.  Also, the three governance indicators are highly correlated exceeding 60 percent each. 
For this reason, Globerman and Shapiro (2002) and Lio and Liu (2008) argue that it will be very difficult to use 
them simultaneously in a single regression equation for avoidance of the multicollinearity problem. Hence, we 
treat the quality of governance indices separately in estimating equation (1). 
Table 2. Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
Variable Income HDI Trade Rulaw Requal Polstab 
Income 1.000     
HDI 0.858 1.000 
Trade 0.576 0.479 1.000 
Rulaw 0.635 0.656 0.387 1.000 
Requal 0.644 0.636 0.454 0.758 1.000 
Polstab 0.457 0.365 0.457 0.693 0.743 1.000 
 
Interpreting the governance-development relationship on the basis of the pairwise correlations could be 
misleading since the influence of other relevant variables is not controlled for. For this reason, a comprehensive 
regression of equation (1) for each different pair of governance indicators becomes necessary. 
Table 3 reports the OLS regression results with logarithmic transformation of per capita income as 
dependent variable. We estimated the basic model with the control variable, , in column (1) before 
introducing each pair of the governance indicators. The coefficient of  is positive and significantly 
unchanged throughout the estimation from column (1) - (4). This supports evidence from cross-country studies 
that countries that more open attract increased trade and capital inflows which stimulates growth (see 
Baliamoune and Ndikumana, 2007). 
Table 3, column (2) shows the effect of the rule of law index () capturing a dimension of governance 
involving the respect of citizens and the state for institutions that govern both social and economic interactions. 
Its coefficient is positive and statistically significant with a one-standard deviation change increasing income by 
                                                        
4 This include: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia. 
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a factor of 0.274. The result is strongly in line with Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Rodrik et al. (2002) who 
observed that the same index is positively associated with faster growth and higher per capita income. Therefore, 
it is acknowledge that enforcement of basic fundamental rights such as human and property rights is capable of 
providing a conducive economic environment for factor accumulation. 
 
 
Figure 1: Scatter Plots of Development and Governance Measures 
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Table 3. Income and governance - OLS regressions.  
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 1.245 
(5.544)*** 
2.063 
(9.718)*** 
2.146   
(9.626)*** 
1.698 
(6.739)*** 
Trade 1.150 
(9.06)*** 
0.775  
(6.717)*** 
0.713   
(5.865)*** 
0.927 
(6.721)*** 
Governance Variables 
Rulaw -- 0.274  
(8.394)*** 
-- -- 
Requal -- -- 0.309 
(7.924)*** 
-- 
Polstab -- -- -- 0.094 
(3.545)*** 
No. of Countries 21 21 21 21 
No. of Observations 168 168 168 168 
Adjusted R 0.327 0.525 0.509 0.371 
F-Statistic 
82.263 [0.000] 95.581 [0.000] 87.838  [0.000] 
50.283  
[0.000] 
Notes: The dependent variable is Real GDP Per capita. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***,**,* statistically 
significant at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively.  
 
The second dimension of governance involving government’s capacity to effectively manage its resources and 
implement sound policies is captured using the regulatory quality index (). Its coefficient is positively 
signed and statistically significant with 0.309 factor improvement in income following a one standard deviation 
change (column 3). In other words, the adoption of less distortionary and market-friendly policies in the areas of 
trade and business is a stimulant for healthy competition and innovation which are crucial for meaningful and 
sustainable development. The political stability index () from column (4) is positively associated with 
higher per capita income and also significant. It implies that a one standard deviation improvement in the 
political climate increases income by a factor of 0.094.  It can be inferred that absence of political violence are 
essential in determining an economy’s capacity for development. Persistent political violence, as the case in SSA, 
frustrates investment and its security thereby impeding factor accumulation and by extension growth and 
development.  
The results in Table 3 are checked for robustness by substituting human development index (HDI) as an 
alternative measure of development performance. The result is presented in Table 4 with same specification. The 
results are robust without any significant variation from that in Table 3 as all variables had the expected sign and 
are statistically significant although the magnitudes are considerably low. 
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Table 4. HDI and governance - OLS regressions.  
Independent Variables (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant -0.071 
 (-0.916) 
0.231 
(3.221)*** 
0.248   
(3.220)*** 
0.039    
(0.438) 
Trade 0.310 
(7.022)*** 
0.171  
(4.385)*** 
0.155   
(3.685)*** 
0.255 
(5.218)*** 
Governance Variables 
Rulaw -- 0.102  
(9.197)*** 
-- -- 
Requal -- -- 0.109 
(8.144)*** 
-- 
Polstab -- -- -- 0.023 (2.449)** 
No. of Countries 21 21 21 21 
No. of Observations 168 168 168 168 
Adjusted R 0.224 0.484 0.443 0.247 
F-Statistic 49.312  
[0.000] 
79.370 
[0.000] 67.527  [0.000] 28.398  [0.000] 
Notes: The dependent variable is Human Development Index (HDI). t-statistics are in parentheses. ***,**,* 
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively.  
 
In sum, the results in Table 3 and 4 reveals that governance has a significant positive effect on development in 
six of the eight regressions which means that good institutional quality plays an important role in the process of  
economic development. A mixture of strong rule of law, quality regulatory framework and political stability are 
essential ingredients which should be emphasized and assigned top priority by governments at all stages of the 
development process.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have made a conscious effort at testing empirically how the quality of governance 
explains development performance across a sample of 21 countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa over the period 
1998 – 2007. This justifies the identification by the World Bank linking Africa’s development problems to a 
crisis of governance and the current emphasis by the Bank on strengthening the performance of governance in 
combating poverty. 
Utilizing the governance datasets developed by Worldwide Governance Indicators, the results generally 
support the current contention in the development literature that quality institutions of governance matters for 
economic development especially for developing countries in re-invigorating a new development trajectory. The 
robustness and magnitude of the specific aspects of governance namely, rule of law, regulatory quality and 
political stability play important roles in influencing development. The results are consistent with previous 
studies on the impact of institutions on economic growth and development.  
Our findings have important policy implications. Genuine commitment of African governments to good 
governance is sine qua non to the achievement of development. Strengthening the rule of law, regulatory 
framework curbing political instability remains the foundation towards improving economic performance. 
Institutional reforms are priorities which should not be overlooked especially in ensuring the independence and 
adequate funding of the justice system and law enforcement agencies to improve access to fair and equitable 
administration of justice for all citizens, constitutional and electoral reforms to control the excessiveness of 
executive powers of African rulers to enhance the attainment of development. Besides, consistent and transparent 
rules for economic transactions aimed at improving economic outcomes and welfare are also important. 
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